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EQUAL PROTECTION AND STATE IMMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY
Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132
285 N.E.2d 736 (1972)
Allison Krause was shot to death during disturbances at Kent State
University. The deceased's father brought a wrongful death action
against the state of Ohio, alleging that agents of the state had acted
negligently in sending armed, inadequately trained National Guardsmen
to the campus. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss
on the ground that the state had not consented to be sued, and there-
fore was immune from tort liability. The court of appeals reversed,'
holding that the immunity doctrine violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, and that the state is responsible for the
tortious acts of its agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed. Held: The provision of the Ohio
constitution2 which permits the state to be sued only with the consent
of the legislature does not violate the equal protection clause.8
The English doctrine of sovereign immunity4 was adopted in the
United States as a part of common law, and, in theory, served to bar
1. Krause v. State, 28 Ohio App. 2d 1, 274 N.E.2d 321 (1971). For commen-
tary on the case prior to the state supreme court's reversal, see 52 B.U.L. Rv. 202
(1972); 21 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 25 (1972); 33 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 611 (1972). See gener-
ally Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for Unconstitutional Conduct: The Aftermath
of Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C.L. Rv. 548 (1972).
2. Omo CONST. art. I, § 16 provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his
land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
and shall have justice administered without denial or delay. Suits may be
brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be pro-
vided by law.
3. Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1052 (1972).
4. The doctrine began as a personal prerogative of the King of England. The
maxim "the king can do no wrong" was, in practice, a jurisdictional bar to suits
against the king in his courts. Equitable relief could be granted, however, through the
king's consent to the use of a petition of right in the Court of Exchequer. See L.
EHmLICH, PROcaEDINGS AGAiNST THE CRowN (1216-1377), at 123-27 (1921); 1 F. POL-
LACK & F. MArrLAND, THE MSToRY oF ENGLISH LAw 512-18 (1909 ed.). See gener-
ally G. ROBINSON, PuBLIc AuTormns AND LEG.AL LiABurrY (1925). In the six-
teenth century courts extended the doctrine to protect the state as a whole. See R.
WATKiNs, THE STATE AS PARTY LiGANT 1-13 (1927); Barry, The King Can Do No
Wrong, 11 VA. L. Rav. 349 (1925). See generally Holdsworth, The History of Reme-
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suits against all governmental entities. 5 To avoid the inequities of ab-
solute adherence to the doctrine, most states enacted legislation to limit
its application." The strictures of the immunity doctrine were relaxed
dies Against the Crown, 38 L.Q. REv. 141 (1922). By the eighteenth century courts
applied it to local as well as national government in England. See W. PRossE, LAW
OF TORTS 970-75 (4th ed. 1971); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort,
34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924). Expansion to local governmental units in England began
with Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). See generally Laski,
The Responsibility of the State in England, 32 HARV. L. REV. 447 (1919).
5. Justifications for the rule advanced by the United States Supreme Court were
generally inadequate. E.g., Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907):
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.
The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1869):
The doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy; the inconvenience and
danger which would follow from any different rule. It is obvious that the
public service would be hindered, and the public safety endangered, if the
supreme authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen,
and consequently controlled in the use and disposition of the means required
for the proper administration of the government.
See also United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846); United States v.
Clark, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821). Even when legislation apparently abrogated the doctrine, the Court's con-
struction of the statute kept the doctrine in force. Basso v. United States, 239 U.S. 602
(1916) (Tucker Act of 1887). See generally Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental
Units, 40 MiNN. L. RPv. 751, 770-73 (1956). The eleventh amendment, a response
to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), prevents suits against states by
citizens of another state in federal courts. See Comment, Private Suits Against States
in the Federal Courts, 33 U. CI. L. REV. 331 (1966).
An illustrative example of the process of judicial enlargement of the doctrine is the
development of privilege from liability in defamation cases. See Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Yaseri v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), affd per curiam,
275 U.S. 503 (1927). But see Greenwood v. Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449, 42 N.W. 413
(1889).
The state courts also applied the doctrine to state governments and all subdivisions
thereof. For early examples, see State v. Hill, 54 Ala. 67 (1875); Mower v. Inhabi-
tants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812); Clodfelter v. State, 86 N.C. 51 (1882); Black
v. Rempublicam, 6 Pa. (I Yeates) 139 (1792); Clark v. State, 47 Tenn. (7 Cold.)
306 (1869); Commonwealth v. Colquhouns, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & Mun.) 213 (1808).
Western states followed precedent, frequently without further rationale. See, e.g.,
Davis v. State, 30 Idaho 137, 163 P. 373 (1917); Albin Co. v. Commonwealth, 128
Ky. 295, 108 S.W. 299 (1908); Benda v. State, 109 Neb. 132, 190 N.W. 211 (1922);
Billings v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 67 P. 583 (1902); State ex rel. Harney v. Hastings,
12 Wis. 664 (1860). For the judicial origins of the doctrine in Ohio, see State ex rel.
Parrott v. Board of Pub. Works, 36 Ohio St. 409 (1881); Miers v. Turnpike Co., 11
Ohio 273 (1842); State v. Franklin Bank, 10 Ohio 91 (1840).
6. See generally Note, Administration of Claims Against the Sovereign-A Sur-
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by three general means: (1) limited consent to sue through the existing
judicial system; 7 (2) creation of administrative agencies to hear claims
against the state;8 or (3) direct disposition of claims by the legislature.,
In addition, courts, moving away from strict application of the doc-
trine, have created exceptions to the general rule of immunity. 1° Most
courts permit recovery for torts arising in the course of "proprietary,"
as opposed to "governmental," functions,"' or out of "ministerial," as
vey of State Techniques, 68 HAnv. L. RV. 506 (1955). State courts sometimes frus-
trated attempted legislative relief from the doctrine. See, e.g., Murdock Parlor Grate
Co. v. Commonwealth, 152 Mass. 28, 24 N.E. 854 (1890); Manion v. State, 303
Mich. 1, 5 N.W.2d 527, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 677 (1942); Smith v. State, 227 N.Y.
405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920). See generally Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity
Doctrine in the United States 1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 795; Pugh, Historical
Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476 (1953).
7. Usually these states recognize classes of tort actions which can be brought
against the state. In Arkansas, Illinois, Michigan, and New York a separate court ex-
ists to hear these claims. See, e.g., N.Y. Cr. CL. ACT § 8, 9 (McKinney 1963, Supp.
1972). See generally F. SPErGEL, THE ILLINOIS COURT OF CLAIMS: A STUDY OF STATE
LIAnrnTv (1962); Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. REv. 751
(1956).
8. See, e.g., IDAHo CONST. art. IV, § 18; Ky. R v. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.070-.160
(1972); MIN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.66-.86 (1967, Supp. 1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 127.11 (Page 1953); UTAH CoNsT. art. VII, § 13. See generally Annot., 169 A.L.R.
105 (1947).
9. See generally Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1363 (1954); Shumate, Tort Claims Against State Governments, 9 LA.w & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 242 (1942). For a discussion of enactment of "private laws" in Con-
gress, see Gellhorn & Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims Against the
United States, 55 COLuM. L. Rav. 1 (1955). Some statutes authorize governmental
entities to buy liability insurance and prohibit them from raising an immunity defense
within the limits of the policy. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 71.185 (1969); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 39-01-08 (1972); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-28 to 63-30-34 (1968); see
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2904 (1953) (school buses); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.284-.294
(1973) (same); cf. Anx. STAT. ANN. § 66-3240 (1966) (direct action against in-
surer). For judicial treatment of the insurance problem, see Sullivan v. Midlothian
Park Dist., 51 fI. 2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Village of
Wadsworth, 109 Ohio St. 440, 142 N.E. 900 (1924); Cunningham v. County Court,
148 W. Va. 303, 134 S.E.2d 725 (1964). See generally Gibbons, Liability Insurance
and the Tort Immunity of State and Local Government, 1959 DUKE L.J. 588.
10. See generally Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Lawmaking
in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REv. 163 (1963); Note, Separation of Powers and
the Discretionary Function Exception: Political Questions in Tort Litigation Against
the Government, 56 IowA L REV. 930, 932-53 (1971); Comment, Role of the Courts
in Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964 Du=a L.J. 888.
11. See People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d 754, 178 P.2d 1 (1947); Henderson
v. Twin Falls Co., 56 Idaho 124, 50 P.2d 597 (1935); Hill v. City of Boston, 122
Mass. 344 (1877); Rich Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Author., 216
S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950). "Proprietary" refers generally to activities carried
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opposed to "discretionary," acts.12  States may "consent" to be sued,
or "waive" the immunity defense.'" Some courts refuse to sustain the
defense in nuisance' 4 or contractr actions, and in some jurisdictions
the state's immunity does not extend to its agents.' 6
on by private entities. Pianka v. State, 46 Cal. 2d 208, 293 P.2d 458 (1956). In
Morris v. Mount Lebanon Township School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d 737 (1958),
the court, in determining if an activity was "proprietary," also considered whether the
activity was required by statute, and whether it was done primarily to make a profit.
See also Jones v. City of New Haven, 34 Conn. 1 (1867) (primarily for welfare of
inhabitants); Pearl v. Inhabitants of Revere, 219 Mass. 604, 107 N.E. 417 (1914)
(profit-making); Keever v. City of Mankato, 113 Minn. 55, 129 N.W. 158 (1910);
Pleasants v. City of Greensboro, 192 N.C. 820, 135 S.E. 321 (1926); 22 VA. L. REV.
910 (1936).
12. See Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Hitchins
Bros. v. Mayor of Frostburg, 68 Md. 100, 11 A. 826 (1887); Kelso v. City of Tacoma,
63 Wash. 2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964). "Discretionary" refers generally to acts which
involve official judgment on the part of an officer-for example, judicial decision-
making, and voting by legislators. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949);
Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal. App. 2d 872, 222 P.2d 940 (1950). The distinction
has also been recognized by statute. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act § 421(a), 28
U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(b) (1963); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 41.032 (1971). See also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); James,
The Federal Tort Claims Act and the "Discretionary Function Exception," 10 U. FLA.
L. REv. 184 (1957). The same distinction has been applied to determine whether states
are immune from federal excise taxes. See, e.g., Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214
(1934); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905). But cf. New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
13. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 275 (1964); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273 (1906); State e- rel. Williams v. Glander, 148 Ohio St. 188,
74 NE.2d 82 (1947) (dissenting opinion). "Waiver" is sometimes the rationale
for permitting suit against the government in contract cases. See, e.g., George & Lynch,
Inc. v. State, 57 Del. 158, 197 A.2d 734 (1964).
14. See, e.g., Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 Cal. 2d 104, 162 P.2d 625 (1945);
Windle v. City of Springfield, 320 Mo. 459, 8 S.W.2d 61 (1928); Hines v. City of
Rocky Mount, 162 N.C. 409, 78 S.E. 510 (1913); Chandler v. Davidson County, 142
Tenn. 265, 218 S.W. 222 (1919). Contra, Landau v. City of New York, 180 N.Y. 48,
72 N.E. 631 (1904).
15. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. Sys. v. Blanton, 49 Ga. App. 602, 176 S.E. 673
(1934): V.S. DiCarlo Constr. Co. v. State, 485 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1972); Meens v.
State Bd. of Educ., 127 Mont. 515, 267 P.2d 981 (1954); Todd v. Board of Edue.
Lands & Funds, 154 Neb. 606, 48 N.W.2d 706 (1951); P, T & L Constr. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 55 N.J. 341, 262 A.2d 195 (1970).
16. See, e.g., Lenth v. Schug, 226 Iowa 1, 281 N.W. 510 (1939); Heiser v. Severy,
117 Mont. 105, 158 P.2d 501 (1945); accord, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
(injunction); cf. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952); Oio
REv. CODE ANN. § 5923.37 (Page Supp. 1972) (willful misconduct of militia). But
see Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). See gener-
ally L. DAVID, THE TORT LABILITY OF PUBLIC OMCERS (1940).
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In a growing minority of states, courts have attempted to abolish the
doctrine on non-constitutional grounds. In these states the legislatures
have, as a rule, responded by enacting statutes which either codify, or
restrict the effect of, the courts' decisions. 7
A 1912 amendment to the Ohio constitution 8 abolished the com-
mon law defense of governmental immunity and authorized suits
against the state "in such courts and in such manner" as the legislature
17. For cases in which courts have led the way in abrogating immunity, see
Spencer v. General Hosp., 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Stone v. Arizona Highway
Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429
S.W.2d 45 (1968); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136
Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130
(Fla. 1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); Klepinger v. Board of Comm'rs, 239 N.E.2d
160 (Ind. App. 1968); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1
(1961); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962);
Rice v. Clark County, 79 Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963); Willis v. Department of
Conservation, 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970).
For cases in which courts have subsequently retreated, see City & County of Denver
v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960); Perkins v. State, 251 N.E.2d 30
(Ind. 1969); cf. State v. Shinkle, 231 Ore. 528, 373 P.2d 674 (1962).
For examples of legislation passed in response to court decisions on the immunity
doctrine, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (Supp. 1971); CAL. GOV'T CODE H9 810-
996.6 (Deering Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 1-101 to 10-101 (Smith-Hurd
1966, Supp. 1973); NEv. Rav. STAT. §§ 41.031-.039 (1971); N.J. RaV. STAT. § 52:4A-1
(Supp. 1973). See generally Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign With-
out Immunity, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 161 (1963).
For examples of legislative initiative, see ALASKA STAT. §§ 9.50.250-.300 (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. Rv. § 7-465 (1966); IowA CODE ANx. H9 25A.1-.20 (1967, Supp.
1972); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970, Supp. 1972); WAsH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.92.010-.170, 4.96.010-.020 (1962, Supp. 1972). See generally Peck, The
Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV.
265, 287-93 (1963).
When the immunity doctrine is upheld in court, it is more often on the ground of
deference to legislative prerogative than on the merits of the doctrine. Hutchinson v.
Board of Trustees, 288 Ala. 20, 256 So. 2d 281 (1971); Duncan v. Koustenis, 260
Md. 98, 271 A.2d 547 (1970); Fette v. City of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1963);
Gossler v. City of Manchester, 107 N.H. 310, 221 A.2d 242 (1966); Clark v. Ruidoso-
Hondo Valley Hosp., 72 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d 168 (1963); McKenzie v. City of Florence,
234 S.C. 428, 108 S.E.2d 825 (1959); Conway v. Humbert, 82 S.D. 317, 145 NAV.2d
524 (1966); cf. Nelson v. Turnpike Author., 157 Me. 174, 170 A.2d 687 (1961);
Visidore Corp. v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 48 NJ. 214, 225 A.2d 105 (1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967). Some state constitutions prohibit suit against the
state. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35. See generally 3 K.
DAvis, ADmmsshmnvE LAw T"EATMsE § 25.00 et seq. (Supp. 1965); Vanlandingham,
Local Governmental Immunity Re-examined, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 237 (1966).
18. OMo CONST. art. I, § 16.
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might provide. Although an administrative agency was organized in
1917 to hear certain claims against the state,19 the Ohio General As-
sembly has never passed general enabling legislation permitting the use
of Ohio's courts for such claims. 20  Holding the amendment to be per-
missive rather than self-executing, 21 courts continued to recognize im-
munity as a defense. 22
In Ohio, immunity creates two classifications: first, the distinction
between plaintiffs injured by governmental and by non-governmental
tort-feasors; and secondly, the distinction between plaintiffs injured by
governmental tort-feasors in the exercise of excepted and of non-ex-
cepted activities. The United States Supreme Court has established two
19. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 127.11 (Page 1953). The "Sundry Claims Board"
is authorized to award only up to $1,000; there is no provision for trial by jury or
appellate review. The General Assembly is free to overrule the Board's recommenda-
tions by refusing to appropriate funds from the treasury. See generally Walsh, The
Ohio Sundry Claims Board, 9 Oio ST. L.. 437 (1948).
20. For examples of isolated legislative exceptions to immunity in Ohio, see Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 111.19 (Page 1953) (fees paid under protest); id. § 1523.10 (1964)
(fees on water conservation bonds); id. § 5301.24 (1970) (foreclosure sales). See
generally Note, Claims Against the State of Ohio: The Need for Reform, 36 U. CIN. L.
REV. 239 (1971).
21. That is, the courts held that the 1912 amendment by itself did not grant the
right to sue the state, but only authorized the legislature to so grant. Since the leg-
islature has not granted the right, the immunity defense is still available. See, e.g.,
Farkas v. Fulton, 130 Ohio St. 390, 199 N.E. 850 (1936); Raudabaugh v. State, 96
Ohio St. 513, 118 N.E. 102 (1917). See also 1 & 2 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO (1912).
22. Schaffer v. Board of Trustees, 171 Ohio St. 228, 168 N.E.2d 547 (1960);
Wolf v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959); Palumbo v.
Industrial Comm'n, 140 Ohio St. 54, 42 N.E.2d 766 (1942); Aldrich v. City of Youngs-
town, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922). Liability in Ohio's political subdivi-
sions and municipalities is predicated on the governmental-proprietary functions test.
For examples of the confusion created by this test, see Moloney v. City of Columbus,
2 Ohio St. 2d 213, 208 N.E.2d 141 (1965) (zoo-proprietary); Hyde v. City of Lake-
wood, 2 Ohio St. 2d 155, 207 N.E.2d 547 (1965) (non-profit hospital-governmental);
Hack v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio SL 383, 189 N.E.2d 857 (1963) (swimming pool-
proprietary); Eversole v. City of Columbus, 169 Ohio St. 205, 158 N.E.2d 515 (1959)
(arts and crafts center-proprietary); Broughton v. City of Cleveland, 167 Ohio St.
29, 146 N.E.2d 301 (1957) (garbage disposal-governmental); City of Cleveland v.
Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 97, 91 N.E.2d 480 (1950) (parking lot-proprie-
tary); Doud v. City of Cincinnati, 152 Ohio St. 132, 87 N.E.2d 243 (1949) (mainte-
nance of sewer-proprietary); State ex rel. Gordon v. Taylor, 149 Ohio St. 427,
79 N.E.2d 127 (1948) (sewer construction-governmental); Selden v. City of Cuya-
hoga Falls, 132 Ohio St. 223, 6 N.E.2d 976 (1937) (maintenance of swimming pool-
governmental); State ex rel. White v. City of Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 230, 181 N.E. 24
(1932) (maintenance of music hall-proprietary); City of Wooster v. Arbenz, 116
Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927) (street maintenance-governmental).
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tests for determining whether legislative classifications violate the equal
protection clause. First, while a state is permitted considerable latitude
to classify people within its jurisdiction, the classification must bear
at least a "reasonable relation" to the purpose of the legislation. 23 Sec-
ondly, if the classification is either based on "suspect criteria," such as
race, or affects a "fundamental right," a stricter test is applied: there
must be a "compelling state interest" or "substantial justification" for
creating or enforcing the classification.24
Applying the "reasonable relation" test, the majority in Krause found
a rational basis for each classification. First, the court stated that, al-
though plaintiffs with identical causes of action may be distinguished in
Ohio solely on the basis of whether the defendant is a public or private
party, it would not "preclude the combined legislative judgment that
there may be substantive differences between the two types of con-
duct," public and private. 25 Secondly, the court found that the excep-
tions to immunity for proprietary functions had been applied by Ohio
courts only to local political entities and not to the state itself, and that
23. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949);
Takahishi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920):
mhe classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886). This traditional test applies particularly to economic regulation.
See Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-
Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 716 (1969). See generally Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Htiv. L. Rav. 1065, 1131 (1969).
24. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis original):
[We reject appellants' argument that a mere showing of a rational relation-
ship between the waiting period [for eligibility in a state welfare program]
and these four admittedly permissible state objectives will suffice to justify
the classification. . . . [I] moving ... appellees were exercising a con-
stitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise
of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling govern-
mental interest, is unconstitutional.
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). See cases cited notes 33-35 infra; cf.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALiF. L. Rnv. 341 (1949).
25. 31 Ohio St. 2d at 146, 285 N.E.2d at 745 (emphasis added). Compare State
ex rel. Wallace v. City of Cellina, 29 Ohio St. 2d 109, 279 N.E.2d 866 (1972) (dictum),
with Porter v. City of Oberlin, 1 Ohio St. 2d 143, 152, 205 N.E.2d 363, 369 (1965),
and State ex rel. Hostetter v. Hunt, 132 Ohio St. 568, 9 N.E.2d 676 (1937).
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"sufficient substantive differences" exist between state and local gov-
ernments to justify different treatment.28
The "reasonable relation" test is founded upon judicial deference to
legislative choice. Even when the state has failed to demonstrate a ra-
tional basis, classifications have been upheld if the court can construct
one.27  Thus, the majority in Krause was satisfied that immunity was
constitutionally permissible after hypothesizing sufficient differences
between private, state, and municipal parties to support their different
statuses as defendants in tort actions.
The dissent in Krause, however, reasoned that the right of access to
the courts2 is as basic as any of the "fundamental rights" recognized
by the Supreme Court. Because immunity has the legal effect of deny-
ing that right to some, the dissent concluded that the immunity doc-
trine must be closely scrutinized under the stricter equal protection
test.29  While the state is not required to treat things which are "dif-
ferent in fact" as though they were the same, the determination of
whether they are different should be based on the "underlying substan-
tive conduct involved, and not the status of the party-defendant, when a
denial of due process is involved." 30  The dissent rejected the state's
26. 31 Ohio St. 2d at 146, 285 N.E.2d at 745:
Whether it is the nature of the conduct or activity undertaken, or the differ-
ences in its governmental and corporate existence, we need not now explore.
These substantive differences permit of different remedies and defenses.
27. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961):
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power de-
spite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statu-
tory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S.
220 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
28. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (damage remedy available for violation of fourth amendment
rights although not authorized by Congress); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184
(1964) (state's immunity can be waived when its activities fall within federal regula-
tory powers).
29. 31 Ohio St. 2d at 151, 285 N.E.2d at 747-48 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis
original):
A classification that discriminates with respect to a right of very great im-
portance is not to be sustained merely because the classification has a ra-
tional basis; if the state fails to supply a substantial justification, its dis-
crimination is invidious and unconstitutional.
30. Id. at 153, 285 N.E.2d at 749 (emphasis original).
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argument that abrogating immunity would impair the function of state
government, pointing out that governments in states where immunity
has been eliminated "are still able to provide the functions and services
necessary in a modem society . . . ." The dissent noted that in-
creased costs to state government, in any event, are not a sufficient
justification for denial of equal protection. 82 The dissent concluded
that the doctrine of respondeat superior should apply because the state
failed to carry its burden of demonstrating a compelling interest in bar-
ring suits by its residents.
The analyses in Krause reflect a basic problem in the present status
of equal protection litigation, namely, the inadequacy of standards for
determining which test to apply. The Supreme Court has clearly estab-
lished only three major "fundamental interests" to be protected by the
stricter test: voting,3 3 interstate travel, 4 and criminal appeals.8 Re-
cent decisions indicate that the present Court will not readily extend
this test into new areas.38 When the interest affected is founded on ex-
press constitutional grounds-for example, free speech-it carries its
own safeguards. 37 But just what rights not explicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution warrant special treatment is unclear.3 5
31. Id. at 155, 285 N.E.2d at 750.
32. Id. at 155 n.18, 285 N.E.2d at 750 n.18, citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
33. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sins, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
34. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
35. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956). See generally Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAv. L. REv. 7 (1969).
36. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(school-financing system based on ad valorem property tax); United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973), rev'g 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (filing fees in
bankruptcy); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (allocation of welfare bene-
fits); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S.
357 (1971) (bail statute). See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
37. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
38. For example, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court in ef-
fect recognized a "constitutional right to travel interstate," without specifying the con-
stitutional ground from which the right derived:
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and
our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citi-
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At the same time, the Court is increasingly less willing to conjecture
as to a state's reasons for classifying; even under the "reasonable rela-
tion" test, judicial scrutiny is becoming more vigorous. 9 For exam-
ple, in Reed v. Reed4 0 the Court invalidated an Idaho statute which gave
mandatory preference to men over women in the selection of adminis-
trators for decedents' estates. Rather than expanding the stricter test
to include sex as a "suspect" criterion, the Court found the statute
"arbitrary" under the "reasonable relation" test, although the state had
argued that the preference made the selection process more efficient
by eliminating hearings on the merits and avoided intra-family disputes
-reasons clearly sufficient under older "reasonable relation" interpre-
tations to support the classification.41
Because the Supreme Court's use of the equal protection tests does
not provide clear guidance, the Krause majority's choice of the "reason-
able relation" test over the stricter test may be justifiable. Even under
the "reasonable relation" test, however, the court should have exam-
zens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land unin-
hibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict
this movement. . . . We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this
right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision.
Id. at 629-30. The problem is the difficulty in predicting when this type of analysis
will be applied to other challenged restrictions which admittedly do not affect explicit
first amendment rights. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973):
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights
in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus the key to
discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in com-
parisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to sub-
sistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is
as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing
whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution.
39. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 93 S. CL 2821 (1973); Sugar-
man v. Dougall, 93 S. Ct. 2842 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); James v.
Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Rinaldi v.
Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). See generally Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-
Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 91 (1966).
40. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Frontiero v. Richardson, 410 U.S. 677, 682 (1973),
Justice Brennan, writing for four members of the Court, placed sex classifications in the
"inherently suspect" group, relying on Reed. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell
pointed out that Reed "did not add sex to the narrowly limited group of classifications
which are inherently suspect," and urged that any decision expanding its authority be
reserved. Id. at 692.
41. See cases cited note 27 supra.
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ined more closely the rationality of the classifications created by im-
munity under Ohio law.42
42. For example, immunity may be viewed in two ways: from an economic point
of view, as a means of protecting the state from the burden of defending lawsuits;
and from a personal rights point of view, as preventing individuals from adjudicating
tort claims. The first view leads to the "reasonable relation" test, the second to the
stricter test. Even assuming that the economic view should prevail, the recent "rea-
sonable relation" cases seem to require an investigation of the relationship between
Ohio's financial structure and capacity to perform needed services, and the immunity
doctrine, particularly in light of its inconsistent exceptions. See note 22 supra.
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